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Abstract
Internal control regulation effectiveness remains controversial given the recent financial
crisis. To address this issue we examine the financial reporting effects of the Federal
Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control
provisions. Exemptions from these provisions for banks with assets under $500 million
and for non-U.S. banks provides two unaffected control samples. Our difference-in-
differences method suggests that FDICIA-mandated internal control requirements
increased  loan-loss provision validity, earnings persistence and cash-flow predictability,
and reduced benchmark-beating and accounting conservatism for affected versus
unaffected banks. More pronounced effects in interim versus fourth quarters suggests that
greater auditor presence substitutes for internal control regulation.
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11. Introduction
Internal control systems have long been advocated as a mechanism for establishing
high quality financial reporting, and firms have voluntarily used them for this purpose.  In
response to several high-profile financial frauds, the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) issued their Internal Control -
Integrated Framework in September 1992. This report provided a foundation for
assessing internal control effectiveness. Since then, several waves of accounting scandals
have led to regulatory requirements for managers and auditors to report on internal
control effectiveness. Most recently, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) internal control
provisions have fueled the ongoing debate among regulators and practitioners about the
effectiveness of this type of regulation in improving financial reporting quality given the
subsequent financial crisis. In a speech delivered at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Global Capital Markets Summit, James Turley (2008), Chairman and CEO of Ernst &
Young, calls for “a global debate about what management should be saying about its
controls, (and) what auditors should be saying about them, if anything.”
Supporters of internal controls regulation argue that limiting managerial discretion
improves financial reporting quality. While potentially true for firms with material
internal control weaknesses, limiting managerial discretion may not improve financial
reporting, on average, for all regulated firms and could potentially reduce financial
reporting informativeness. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) show that managers
with discretion to report conservatively can signal their private information about the
probability of good future prospects. Essential to resolving this argument is the ability to
2isolate changes in financial reporting due to internal controls regulation. In their study
evaluating the effectiveness of SOX internal controls regulation, Hochberg et al. (2009)
point out that “the central challenge to distinguishing between the two main views … is
the lack of a control group of … firms unaffected by the legislation.”
  The internal control provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1992 (FDICIA) facilitate meeting this “control group” challenge by
exempting some firms from these provisions. In the absence of an explicit exclusion, the
FDICIA provisions apply to all insured depository institutions.1 Such an exclusion exists
for the FDICIA internal control provisions, in contrast to all other FDICIA provisions.
FDICIA exempts institutions with assets less than $500 million from its internal control
monitoring and reporting requirements. Specifically, these institutions are exempted from
FDICIA’s requirements that management issue a report on the effectiveness of internal
controls over financial reporting, and that their independent public accountant attest to
management’s report. This exemption provides a control group unaffected by the internal
control legislation, but otherwise similarly affected by the remaining FDICIA provisions.
We examine the relative impact of this regulatory shift in internal control systems
monitoring on financial reporting quality for the average affected versus unaffected firm.
We compare annual and quarterly financial reporting of bank holding companies
(banks) affected by FDICIA’s internal control provisions to that of unaffected banks.
Specifically, we examine changes in: the validity of the loan loss provision, earnings
quality, benchmark-beating, and accounting conservatism. We analyze two samples, (1) a
                                                 
1 While FDICIA regulations did bring Savings and Loans (S&Ls) under the auspices of the FDIC, this
study examines the impact of FDICIA-mandated internal control provisions on commercial banks.
3sample of U.S. public and private banks included in the Fed Form Y9-C Regulatory
Filing database and (2) a sample of publicly-traded banks included in the COMPUSTAT
database.2 Our difference-in-differences research design isolates the effects of the
FDICIA internal controls provision by controlling for changes in financial reporting
unrelated to those provisions. We validate our control samples by testing for differences
between the affected and unaffected firms in the pre-regulation period.
We argue that in addition to providing a control sample, our setting has several
advantages for examining how internal controls regulation affects financial reporting.
First, the effective date of FDICIA enables a long-range study of the impact of the first
regulatory enforcement of COSO-based internal control provisions, which have served as
the cornerstone of future regulation. The relationship between FDICIA and SOX internal
control reforms has been well documented, with Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Chairman Cox (2007) declaring that “FDICIA was a ’clear antecedent’ to the SOX
internal control reforms.” Second, focusing on a single industry allows us to isolate and
examine changes in the validity of the account most likely affected by internal control
deficiencies, the loan-loss provision, and to explore how account-specific changes lead to
more general changes in financial reporting. Third, our examination of all firms affected
by the regulation, rather than only those most likely to benefit from the regulation (i.e.
those with material internal control weaknesses), allows us to make an unbiased
assessment of the financial reporting impact of the regulation on all affected firms.
Finally, our comparison of the interim quarters to the fourth quarter allows us to assess
whether the extent of auditor presence substitutes for internal controls regulation.
                                                 
 2 Although FDICIA applies at both the bank and holding company levels, we focus on holding companies
to increase comparability between our Regulatory and COMPUSTAT analyses.
4We compare the change in financial reporting for our affected and control firms in
the seven-year periods before and after the passage of FDICIA. First we examine the
properties of the annual financial reports. We find that the FDICIA-mandated internal
control requirements lead to improvements in the validity of the loan-loss provision.
Specifically, the association between the loan-loss provision and actual loans written off
for affected banks strengthened in the period after the enactment of FDICIA. This
improvement addresses the GAO’s (1994) concern “that banks’ loan-loss allowances
included large supplemental reserves that were not linked to analysis of loss exposure or
supported by evidence.” We find a corresponding increase in both earnings’ persistence
and ability to predict cash flows, and a reduction in the use of earnings management to
report positive earnings growth, suggesting that reducing supplemental reserves generally
improves reporting quality. However, we also find that earnings conservatism declines
for affected versus unaffected banks in both samples. This reduction in conservatism is
also consistent with a reduction in supplemental reserves.
Next we examine the properties of quarterly reports to determine whether the
effects are larger in the interim quarters relative to the fourth quarter, when an increased
auditor presence might substitute for improved internal controls. Consistent with this
hypothesis, we find that the improvements in the validity of the loan loss provision, and
the increase in earnings persistence and predictability of future cash flows, are all larger
in the first three quarters than in the fourth quarter.
Taken together, these results suggest that the FDICIA-mandated internal control
provisions resulted in the average bank exercising less reporting discretion. This reduced
discretion creates a greater association between current reported accrual numbers and
5future cash flow numbers. However, as a result of this improved association, the reported
accrual numbers also became less conservative. Thus, the conclusion about how this
regulation affected the quality of financial reports depends on one’s definition of quality.
Our results suggest improved reporting quality based on the FASB’s argument in
Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 2 that “conservatism in financial
reporting … [i.e.] any attempt to understate results consistently is likely to raise questions
about the reliability and integrity of the information about those results.” However,
Watts’ (2003) argument that the “attempts to ban conservatism ... are likely to fail and
produce unintended consequences” suggest that the changes in financial reporting
characteristics that we document may indicate a deterioration, rather than an
improvement, in financial reporting quality.
We believe our results can inform the debate between regulators and practitioners
over the merits of internal controls regulation. Our focus on banks is particularly relevant
to the renewed debate over this type of regulation arising from the recent financial crisis.
In addition, our study can be used to draw inferences about the implications of similar
changes in internal control regulations outside of the banking industry, in particular for
regulations that are also based on the COSO framework, such as the SOX internal control
provisions. Thus, we believe that our results could have broad implications for
understanding the effects of internal control regulations.
Section 2 provides the background for our study. We discuss hypotheses in
Section 3; sample selection in Section 4 and research design in Section 5. We present our
results in Section 6 and discuss our sensitivity test results in section 7.  We conclude in
Section 8.
62. Background
2.1 Development of Internal Control Regulation in the U.S.
2.1.1 COSO
COSO is a private-sector initiative begun in 1985 to address fundamental causes
of financial reporting scandals.  Reliability of financial reporting is one of the three
objectives of the internal control process in the COSO framework. The COSO Report
provides guidelines for assessing effective control system attributes, and states that:
 internal control is broadly defined as a process, affected by an entity’s board of
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable
assurance regarding achievement of effectiveness and efficiency of operations,
reliable financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
3
In an October, 2006, speech, Charles D. Niemeier, a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) member, states that:
 Although U.S. companies have been required to have internal controls over their
accounting since Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, by
the 1990s many corporations had still failed to establish or maintain effective
controls … that would ensure integrity in the preparation of the overall financial
statements. … This lack of internal controls allowed senior corporate managers to
manipulate official reported financial results to look better than they were…
In the early 1990s, Congress attempted to bolster controls in the banking sector at
least, by requiring in … FDICIA that certain financial institutions provide banking
regulators with assessments of, and auditor attestations on, their internal controls.
2.1.2 FDICIA
FDICIA was enacted to change federal oversight of depository institutions, and as
a result, four new sections were added to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (The Act).
The Act applies to all depository institutions that are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), unless an explicit exemption is made for a particular
section of The Act. Of these four sections, only Section 36 entitled “Early Identification
                                                 
3 http://www.coso.org/key.htm
7of Needed Improvements in Financial Management,” includes such an exemption.
Specifically, this section includes an exemption for institutions with total assets less than
the greater of $150 million, or a larger amount prescribed by regulation. On June 2, 1993,
the FDIC issued such a regulation, increasing this exemption to cover banks with assets
less than $500 million [GAO (1996)].  This exclusion was allowed for economic
efficiency reasons (Murphy, 2004). Consequently, only U.S. banks with assets greater
than $500 million are subject to the internal controls provision of FDICIA.
Section 36 requires that banks establish an independent audit committee, and that
they report annually on “Management Responsibility for Financial Statements and
Internal Controls” and “Internal Control Evaluation and Reporting Requirements for
Independent Public Accountants.” The management responsibility report must be signed
by the CEO and the chief accounting or financial officer. The report must state
management’s responsibilities for preparing financial statements, establishing and
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and developing procedures for
financial reporting and complying with related laws and regulations. The report must also
provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedures, and the institution’s compliance with laws and regulations relating to safety
and soundness as of the end of the fiscal year. The report of the independent public
accountant must include an attestation to the assertions of management included in the
management report. This annual report also requires an independent audit of the financial
statements (conducted in accordance with GAAS).4
                                                 
4 Our study focuses on the comprehensive effects of the regulation. We do not attempt to isolate which
component of Section 36 may be responsible for changes in the financial reporting environment.
8The other three sections that FDICIA added to The Act apply to all federally
insured depository institutions regardless of size.  Section 37 “Accounting Objectives,
Standards and Requirements”   requires that regulatory accounting be at least as stringent
as GAAP, and that all federal banking agencies maintain uniform accounting standards
when determining statutory or regulatory compliance. Section 38 “Prompt Corrective
Action,”   requires that regulators classify depository institutions into one of five capital
adequacy categories, including three undercapitalized categories, based on the severity of
undercapitalization. The section requires regulators to take 1 or more of 10 specified
actions against institutions in these categories. Section 39 “Standards for Safety and
Soundness,” requires regulators to establish safety and soundness standards related to
operations and management, asset quality, earnings and stock valuation and
compensation.5
2.1.2 Internal Controls and the Loan Loss Provision
The idea that internal control regulation could improve financial reporting
reliability is supported by the GAO’s (1991) report to Congress on banking failures. The
GAO argued that for the failed banks examined “the external reports were distorted by
internal control problems.” In a subsequent report to Congress focusing exclusively on
loan-loss accounting, the GAO (1994) argued that banks’ loan loss allowances included
large supplemental reserves that were not linked to analysis of loss exposure or supported
by evidence. The report states that “use of unjustified supplemental reserves can conceal
                                                 
5 The GAO (1996) report provides an excellent summary of these Sections of The Act. Since these Sections
applied to all firms regardless of size, it appears that FDCIA intended consistent application of  these
regulations  to all regulated banks. If these provisions led to financial reporting improvements for all banks,
this would bias against our finding differential results for our test and control banks consistent with the
internal controls provisions (Section 36). However, if bank examiners applied the mandates of Sections 38
and 39 more stringently to larger banks, this could confound the interpretation of our results.
9critical changes in the quality of an institution’s loan portfolio and undermine the
credibility of financial reports.” The internal control regulation implemented in FDICIA
was designed to improve financial reporting, at least in part, by reducing managers’
ability to create supplemental reserves.
2.1.3 Internal Control Regulations in the 21
st
 Century
The widely-publicized 1999-2001 accounting scandals prompted regulators to
once again consider additional internal controls regulations to restore public confidence
in financial markets. Building directly on the FDICIA implementation of the COSO
framework, Congress passed SOX in July, 2002. The most extensive provisions relate to
internal control system monitoring and reporting. Section 302 requires that management
assess  internal control system validity and notify the board of directors and auditors
about any internal control weaknesses, while Section 404 explicitly requires management
to report annually on internal control system adequacy, and independent auditors to attest
to management’s assessment. Figure 1 outlines the relationship between the FDICIA
internal control regulations, and the subsequent SOX provisions.
The current financial crisis has reenergized the internal control regulation debate
with some arguing for increased regulation while others argue that the failure of existing
regulation to prevent this crisis suggests the futility of additional regulation. In her
confirmation hearings Mary Shapiro, subsequently sworn in as SEC Chairman, stated
that:
 …Accurate, robust, and easy-to-understand financial reporting -- and the
internal controls that guarantee it -- are critically important to investors and to the
efficient functioning of our markets. Right now, we have a system where some issuers are
complying with 404 and others are still exempt from it. It’s time that we bring uniformity
to the system so that investors know what to expect from companies…
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In contrast, in comments made about the government bailout plan in September, 2008,
Mike Huckabee, former Arkansas Governor and Republican presidential candidate stated:
 If Congress wants to do something, here are some suggestions: …Repeal
Sarbanes/Oxley. It has failed. It was supposed to prevent this. It didn’t. Kill it.
Smith (2003) provides an intermediate view pointing out that:
Only government would even purport to pursue the Utopian goal of eliminating
risk… risks are ubiquitous—any decision increases some risks and reduces others;
therefore, the question of balance is critical.
The response to the financial crisis suggests that when assessing how internal controls
regulation affects financial reporting, it is important to consider all regulated firms, not
just those with material weaknesses, and to understand that eliminating all bad outcomes
cannot be the goal of regulation or the benchmark by which regulation is judged.6
2.2. Internal Controls Related Research
Several studies suggest that FDICIA may have strengthened the economic
viability of banks, however, this research has not examined whether the internal control
provisions affect the quality of financial reporting.7 In contrast, SOX internal control
provisions have been studied extensively. Papers examining firms with internal control
deficiencies, including Doyle et al. (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007),  find that
these firms are weaker financially, more complex, growing rapidly, or restructuring, and
have noisier accruals that do not map as well into cash flows. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
(2008) find that earnings’ properties improve subsequent to the disclosure of ineffective
internal controls remediation. However, after controlling for primitive firm
                                                 
6 Given this argument, the fact that some banks reported internal control weaknesses under SOX does not
provide evidence that FDICIA was inadequate.
7 A Treasury Department report indicates that banks’ ROA and ROE doubled between 1991 and 1996
(Carnell, 1997), while Benston and Kaufman (1998) conclude that FDICIA led banks to become more risk
adverse, and less prone to failures.
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characteristics, Ogneva et al. (2007) fail to find cost of capital increases for firms with
internal controls weaknesses. These analyses do not consider all regulated firms.
 Zhang (2007) finds a significantly negative market reaction to SOX  events, with
the combination of restrictions on non-audit services, required corporate governance
enhancements, and Section 404  mandates being costly for the overall market. Cohen et
al. (2008) find an overall decline in accruals-based earnings management following SOX,
but find real earnings management increases. The authors acknowledge that “whether this
decline is caused by the passage of SOX… cannot be inferred from this analysis.”8
In his review of the SOX literature, Coates (2007) states that “the law’s full costs
are hard to quantify, and the benefits even harder, so any honest assessment of
Sarbanes–Oxley must be tentative and qualitative.” Hochberg et al. (2009) review the
SOX-related literature and discuss the difficulties associated with drawing conclusions
without a control sample of firms unaffected by the legislation.
3. Hypothesis Development
We focus on the effect of regulation on average for all affected firms. We argue
that when assessing internal controls regulation it is important to study all affected firms,
not just those reporting material weaknesses or deficiencies in their internal controls.
This argument is consistent with Smith’s (2003) statement that the benefits of mitigating
the risks imposed on the market by those with materially weak internal controls should be
carefully weighed against the costs (both direct and indirect) of regulation borne by those
whose deficiencies are less severe.
                                                 
8 Cohen et al. (2008) explicitly state that the nature of their study does not provide conclusive evidence
whether the decline in earnings management observed post-SOX was caused by SOX, public response to
scandals, or other concurrent events.
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Since we focus on a single industry, we are able to isolate and examine the
account most likely to suffer from internal control problems, as well as explore how
account-specific changes lead to changes in broader financial reporting measures. We
focus on the loan loss provision, which was identified by the GAO (1991 and 1994) as
the account most affected by internal control weaknesses and is typically a bank’s largest
operating accrual. We then examine more comprehensive financial reporting measures,
specifically, earnings persistence and the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows.
While not entirely independent constructs, we believe these two measures are distinct
because our predictability measure should not be influenced by the use of the loan loss
provision to smooth earnings.  To further rule out the smoothing hypothesis, we examine
the effect of the FDICIA internal control provisions on beating a small positive earnings
benchmark. We also acknowledge that reduced discretion may limit managers’ ability to
convey private information, leading to decreased conservatism. Consequently, we
examine how conservatism changes in the pre- to post-period for the affected versus
unaffected firms. These more comprehensive financial reporting measures also generalize
outside the banking industry and provide insights about the potential impact of other
comprehensive internal controls regulations, such as the SOX provisions.9
 In July of 2001, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 102 which
provides the SEC staffs’ guidance for validating the method used to estimate the loan
losses. SAB 102 states that:
 the staff believes that a registrant's loan loss allowance methodology is considered
valid when it … include(s) procedures that adjust loan loss estimation methods to
reduce differences between estimated losses and actual subsequent charge-offs.
                                                 
9 See Francis et al. (2004) and Wysoki (2005) for further discussion of these financial reporting metrics.
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If the changes in internal control monitoring improve the measurement of operating
activities, then we expect FDICA to lead to a stronger association between the loan loss
provision and next period charge-offs for affected banks. Although finding an increased
association between the loan loss provision and future charge-offs might suggest
enhanced loan-loss provision validity, it would not necessarily imply that aggregate
financial reporting has improved.
 However, if the GAO (1991) is correct that external reports were distorted by
loan-loss internal control problems, then we would expect the improvements in loan-loss
provision validity to lead to aggregate improvements in financial reporting. Specifically,
given the importance of the provision in determining reported earnings, we would expect
to see improvements in earnings quality.
Our first earnings quality measure is earnings persistence. Both Dechow and
Dichev (2002) and Wysocki (2005) use this measure to test the validity of “accounting
quality” models. Based on their arguments, we expect earnings persistence to increase for
affected banks in the post-FDICIA period if the regulation worked as intended. However,
other papers, such as Leuz et al. (2003) argue that increased earnings persistence may
reflect earnings smoothing indicating lower rather than higher financial reporting quality.
Higher earnings persistence could result from loan loss provision smoothing, which
would not necessarily imply higher financial reporting quality.
To address this possibility, we consider a second earnings quality measure used
by Wysocki (2005), which is the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows.
Consistent with previous bank earnings quality research (Wahlen,1994, Kanagaretnam et
al., 2004,), we measure cash flows by adding the loan loss provision to earnings before
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taxes.10 The persistence of the provision should not affect this cash flow measure, so we
believe a separate examination of this measure provides additional insights despite the
relatively high correlation between this measure and earnings. By looking at earnings
before the provision, we are able to identify whether the effects of the FDICIA internal
control provisions extend beyond the loan-loss provision. We expect an increase in the
coefficient on our earnings variable in the post-FDICIA period for affected banks, if the
FDICIA-mandated internal control provisions improve the quality of financial reports.
We further address the possibility that increased persistence is attributable to
smoothing by examining how the FDICIA internal control provisions affect benchmark
beating. Specifically, we examine the effect on small positive earnings changes. If
increased persistence is driven by increased smoothing, which Liu and Ryan (2006)
contend occurred during our sample period, then we would expect to find increases in
this type of benchmark beating for affected banks. Alternatively, if FDICIA improves
operating activity measurement, and banks were using loan-loss provision discretion to
avoid missing benchmarks prior to the regulation, then we predict a decrease in
benchmark beating for affected firms. We test these alternatives by examining changes in
the incidence of this benchmark-beating activity.
 While internal controls regulation could improve financial reporting, it is also
possible that reducing discretion could have unintended consequences. We consider the
possibility that the “unjustified supplemental reserves” described by the GAO, instead
reflect justifiable accounting conservatism. Standard & Poors (2002) argues in favor of
                                                 
10 Although our cash flow  and  earnings measures are highly correlated (74% Pearson correlation) given
that they differ only in the inclusion of the loan-loss provision, incorporating depreciation expense, or
estimated accrued interest revenue leaves the correlation virtually unchanged.
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conservatism in loan loss accounting “given the dangers of underestimating the extent of
impaired assets.” We test for this possibility using the conservatism measure employed
by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). We examine whether the association between earnings
changes and lagged negative earnings changes was altered for affected banks. A positive
change would indicate a decrease in accounting conservatism.
We further expect that the financial reporting effect of internal control regulations
may differ by quarter, based on Mendenhall and Nichols’ (1988) argument that “the
quarterly reporting process provides managers with more discretion over interim-period
cost formulations than is available at fiscal year-end” and the evidence in Boyd, Daley,
and Runkle (1994) that these results apply to the loan loss provision in banks. We
examine whether changes in loan-loss provision validity, earnings’ persistence and
predictability of future cash flows, benchmark beating and financial reporting
conservatism differ in the fourth versus interim quarters for affected banks.
4. Sample
FDICIA went into effect during 1993. While FDICIA generally applied to all U.S.
insured depository institutions, FDICIA’s internal control provisions applied only to
those with assets exceeding $500 million, allowing us to identify two distinct control
samples of unaffected banks. The first is U.S. banks with assets below $500 million. The
second is international banks that file U.S. GAAP reports but are not subject to FDICIA.
We draw bank financial data from two sources. The Fed Form Y9-C Regulatory
Filing database provides the most extensive sample, including both publicly-traded and
privately-owned U.S. banks. Our Regulatory sample comes from this database. Annual
financial data reconciled to U.S. GAAP for international banks is available on the
16
COMPUSTAT database if the bank trades American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on a
U.S. exchange.11 Our Compustat sample comes from this database. Although limited to
publicly traded firms, this sample allows us to compare affected banks to two distinct
groups of unaffected banks. Since quarterly data is unavailable for ADR firms, our
quarterly analysis is limited to the regulatory sample. We eliminate observations if the
banks’ affected status changed during the period.12
We identify 16,191 U.S. bank-years and 67,232 U.S. bank-quarters with available
Y9-C data and 4,401 bank-years with available COMPUSTAT data. We classify all
observations from 1986-1992 as the pre-FDICIA period, and all observations from 1995-
2001 as the post-FDICIA period. We omit observations during 1993-1994 from our
analyses because this is the implementation period.13
5. Research Design
We use a difference-in-differences research design to mitigate concerns that our
results are driven by other changes during the period, such as changes in general
economic conditions or changes in regulation - including the other changes required by
FDICIA that affected all U.S. banks. We use two control groups, one with unaffected
banks smaller than the affected banks and one with unaffected banks larger than the
                                                 
11 To maximize sample size; we do not restrict our sample to ADRs filing full U.S. GAAP financial
statements. While all earnings are reported under U.S. GAAP, certain other accounts (i.e. assets) may be
determined using the home country GAAP. Our difference-in-differences research design mitigates the
impact of this issue, and we perform sensitivity tests on capital structure differences across countries.
12  Although it might be interesting to study firms that change affected status during the post regulatory
period, the 9 banks with assets above 500 million that subsequently fall below the regulatory threshold
provide insufficient observations to analyze.  We also think that the 364 unaffected banks that subsequently
exceed the $500 million threshold, representing less than 10% of our sample, provides too small a sample
to study. We have chosen to omit these banks entirely, but including them does not change our results.
13 We study all observations with available data in either the pre- or post-regulatory period, since
examining a constant sample would impose a severe sample selection bias. We discuss the entrance and
exit rates for our test and control samples in our sensitivity analysis section.
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affected banks, to alleviate concerns that any differences documented in the change in
earnings properties are caused by differential effects of economic changes on our test and
control samples.
Our primary analyses compares changes in financial reporting for affected relative
to unaffected banks in the post versus pre-FDICIA periods. For our Regulatory sample,
we use two indicator variables to conduct these tests. 500M is an indicator variable that
equals one if the firm has Total Assets less than $500 million (the FDICIA internal
control provision threshold) at both the beginning and the end of year t, zero otherwise,
and Post is an indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992),
zero otherwise. These variables serve as off-sets to our main variable of interest in each
regression, allowing us to isolate the impact of the FDICIA internal control provisions on
financial reporting.
In our Compustat sample, we include the variable ADR, an indicator variable that
equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs in the U.S. market, zero otherwise. Since all of
the ADR banks in this sample are larger than $2 billion in assets, we cannot interact our
500M and ADR indicator variables. All of the ADR banks would be considered affected
banks based on size, but serve as control firms because non-U.S. banks are not subject to
FDICIA regulations.14 We interact ADR with Post and our variables of interest in each
regression to measure the impact of FDICIA on affected firms.
Our 500M and ADR variables also allow us to examine whether there are
differences in our affected and control samples in the period prior to the regulation.
                                                 
14 The ADR banks are not subject to any of the FDICIA regulations. To the extent that the prompt
corrective action provisions (Sections 38 and 39) of FDICIA affected financial reporting, the ADRs will
serve as a less complete control sample than do the U.S. banks with assets less than $500 million.
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Failure to document significance when these variables are interacted with our variables of 
interest supports the appropriateness of  our control samples. 
We choose to examine a fourteen-year window surrounding the enactment of  
FDICIA for several reasons. Mishkin (1996) points out that as of 1996 “FDICIA has 
never really been tested” because a true test of the regulation requires variation in the 
economic conditions. His comments indicate that FDICIA’s effects could not truly be 
tested using a single year of data, and that a longer testing period is desirable because it 
increases the variety of economic conditions. We end our sample period in 2001 for two 
reasons. First, we wanted symmetric pre- and post-regulation periods. Given that the Y9-
C data began in 1986, this limited us to seven years of data prior to the regulation. 
Second, by limiting our sample to years prior to 2002, we eliminate concerns about the 
potentially confounding affects of the SOX regulation. 
 Petersen (2009) shows that correlation in residuals across firms or time in panel 
data studies of financial data cause bias in OLS standard errors. Consequently, we use a 
generalized linear model to control for potential data clustering in all of our analyses. 
5.2 Annual Analyses 
5.2.1 Relationship between the Provision for Loan Losses and Loan Charge-offs 
If FDICIA-mandated internal control requirements improve loan-loss provision 
validity, we should find a larger association between current period loan-loss provision 
and next period charge-offs. We estimate the following model using both our Regulatory 
and Compustat samples: 
(1)  CHGOFFt+1 = ! + "1Post + "2500Mt + "3Post*500Mt + "4LLPt + "5Post*LLPt  
                                        
+"6500Mt*LLPt  + "7Post*500Mt*LLPt + "8Sizet  + "9Sizet *LLPt  
                          +"10 Nonacct + "11 ADR + "12 Post*ADR +  "13 ADR* LLPt  
                          +"14 ADR* Post*LLPt + e              
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Where: 
CHGOFF
 t+1  –  Loan charge-offs  during year t+1, scaled by beginning Total Assets; 
LLPt              –  Loan-loss provision during year t, scaled by beginning Total Assets; 
Post               –  An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 
1992), zero otherwise; 
500Mt            –  An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $500 million (the 
FDICIA internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and 
end of year t, zero otherwise; 
Sizet              –  The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t; 
Nonacct         -   Non-performing at then end of year t, scaled by beginning Total Assets ; 
ADR             -  An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero 
otherwise.  
 
5.2.2 Earnings Persistence and Predictability of Cash Flows 
  We examine two related but distinct measures of earnings quality: persistence, 
and the ability of earnings to predict future cash flows. Persistence is defined as the 
coefficient on current period pre-tax earnings in a regression of future pre-tax earnings 
(ROAt+1 ) on current pre-tax earnings (ROAt ). We assess earnings’ ability to predict 
future cash flows (EBPt+1) using a regression of one period ahead pre-tax earnings before 
the loan-loss provision on current period pre-tax earnings (ROAt). To investigate the 
effect of FDICIA-mandated internal control requirements on these related earnings 
quality measures, we estimate the following regressions separately for our Regulatory 
sample and our Compustat sample:15 
(2)  ROAt+1  or 
(3) EBPt+1             =! +"1Post + "2500Mt + "3Post*500Mt  
                               +"4ROAt +"5Post*ROAt +"6500Mt*ROAt +"7Post*500Mt*ROAt  
                                              
+"8Sizet + "9Sizet*ROAt + "10 ADR +"11 Post*ADR  
                   +"12 ADR* ROA +"13 ADR* Post*ROAt + e              
 
Where: 
ROAt+n –  Pre-tax Income during year t+n scaled by beginning Total Assets; 
EBPt+1 –  Pre-tax Income before Loan Loss Provision during year t+1 scaled by 
beginning Total Assets;   
                                                 
15
 Since ROE is also a commonly used performance measure in the banking industry, we also estimated this 
regression replacing ROA with ROE and the inferences are unchanged. 
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Post –  An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), 
zero otherwise; 
500Mt –  An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $500 million (the 
FDICIA internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end of 
year t, zero otherwise; 
Sizet –  The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t; 
ADR –  An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero 
otherwise. 
 
5.2.3 Earnings Management 
  
 Following Beatty, Ke and Petroni (2002), we investigate whether banks affected 
by FDICIA were more likely to report small positive earnings changes in the post-period. 
If, prior to the regulation, managers were using their accounting discretion to manage 
earnings, then we would expect benchmark beating to decline for affected banks. We 
estimate the following probit regression on our Regulatory and Compustat samples:  
(4) Small_Pos∆t = ! + "1Post + "2500Mt + "3Post*500Mt +  "4ADR + "5Post*ADR 
                                
 
+   #iControlst + e 
 
Where 
Small_Pos∆t – An indicator variable that equals one if the change in ROA (Pre-tax 
Income scaled by Total Assets) from year t-1 to year t is in the interval 
between 0 and 0.0008, zero otherwise; 
Post –  An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 
1992), zero otherwise; 
500Mt –  An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has Assets > $ 500 
million (the FDICIA internal control provision threshold) at both the 
beginning and end of year t, zero otherwise; 
ADR –  An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero 
otherwise.  
 
Control variables for our regulatory sample are the ones used in Beatty et al. (2002). 
Specifically we include their measures of size, publicly traded status, growth, loans, non-
performing loans, leverage, and change in cash flows. Since information on total loans 
and non-performing loans is only available for our regulatory sample we substitute  the 
allowance for loan losses for our Compustat Sample. 
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5.2.4 Conservatism 
 
 We also examine whether a change in discretion associated with FDICIA internal 
controls regulation results in a change in accounting conservatism. Consistent with Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005), we examine the relationship between a change in earnings and 
the lagged change in earnings, allowing for differences in positive and negative earnings 
changes. There are two major advantages of this conservatism measure. First, unlike the 
Basu (1997) measure, it can be estimated for both our Regulatory and Compustat 
samples, because it does not require market prices. Second, it provides a somewhat less 
controversial measure of timely gain and loss recognition. We estimate the following 
regression on our Regulatory and Compustat samples: 
(5) !ROAt+1=" +#1Post + #2500Mt + #3Post*500Mt  
             +#4ND + #5ND*Post + #6ND* 500M + #7ND*Post*500M  
             +#8!ROAt +#9Post*!ROAt +#10500Mt*!ROAt +#11Post*500Mt*!ROAt    
                   
+#12ND*!ROAt +#13Post*ND*!ROAt +#14500Mt*ND*!ROAt  
                                     
+#15Post*500Mt*ND*!ROAt + #16Sizet 
                                     
+ #17 ADR+ #18 Post*ADR + #19 ADR*ND + #20 Post*ADR*ND 
                         +#21 ADR* !ROA +#22 ADR* Post*!ROAt  
                         +#23 ADR*ND* !ROA +#24 ADR* Post*ND*!ROAt + e 
 
Where: 
!ROAt+n – The change in Pre-tax Income during year t+n scaled by beginning Total 
Assets; 
Post        –  An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), 
zero otherwise; 
500Mt     –  An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $ 500 million (the 
FDICIA internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end 
of year t, zero otherwise; 
ND         –  An indicator variable that equals one if !ROAt is negative, zero otherwise;  
Sizet       –  The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t; 
ADR      –   An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero 
otherwise. 
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5.3 Quarterly Analysis
Given the FDICIA requirement that banks assess their internal controls
environment regularly throughout the year, we expect this regulation to have a greater
impact during interim reporting periods, which are subject to less auditor scrutiny. For
our Regulatory sample, we re-run each of our primary annual regressions using quarterly
data allowing the coefficients to differ for the interim quarters versus the fourth quarter.
5.4 Direct Costs of Internal Control Regulation
Internal controls regulation results in both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs
arise from increased audit fees and compensation for Boards of Directors, including
Audit Committees.  Indirect costs arise if managers ignore important activities instead of
focusing on fine-tuning internal controls or if they spend more time reviewing major
decisions, evaluating and re-evaluating financial reports, and compiling information for
their boards of directors. Measuring these indirect costs is especially difficult. However,
we are able to examine how the non-interest expense of banks affected by the FDICIA
internal controls provisions changed after the implementation of this regulation.
Figure 2 provides the yearly amount of other non-interest expense, scaled by total
assets, for banks that were affected versus unaffected by FDICA’s internal control
provision. Other non-interest expense includes audit fees and other fees paid to outsiders,
including directors and consultants. The chart suggests that the non-operating expense
ratio was lower for the affected banks than for the unaffected banks prior to the passage
of FDICIA. The expense ratio increased for affected banks in the post-FDICIA period,
although the extent to which the ratio for affected banks exceeds that for unaffected
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banks has decreased over time. The increase in this expense ratio for the affected banks,
while not conclusive, is descriptively interesting.
5.5 Sensitivity Tests
Although market conditions during our sample period were relatively stable,
important changes occurred in the banking industry during this period, including (1) a
merger wave associated with the Riegle-Neal Act that opened up nationwide branching
and (2) the repeal of Glass-Steagal restrictions on investment banking activity as a result
of the passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Although we use two different
control samples to reduce the likelihood that these sorts of changes affect our results, we
perform sensitivity tests that identify banks likely affected by these changes.
6. Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the affected versus unaffected banks
in each of our two samples in the pre- and post-FDICIA periods. On average, the sample
banks report positive pre-tax earnings and positive earnings before the loan loss
provision, our proxy for cash flows from operations. The average size of the banks in our
Compustat sample is larger than in our Regulatory sample.
6.2 Annual Regressions
In Table 2, we provide the results of our loan-loss models. The primary
coefficient of interest is on the loan loss provision in the post-period for affected banks
(Post*500Mt* LLPt ). For both samples, we find a significantly positive relationship, at
the 1% level, between this variable and one-period ahead loan charge-offs (CHGOFFt+1).
This finding indicates a stronger association between accrual and operating activity for
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affected relative to unaffected banks during the post-period.17 We also find a significantly
negative coefficient on the interaction of ADR and LLPt in the post-period, consistent
with the ADR firms being unaffected by FDICIA’s internal control provisions.
The lack of significant coefficients on 500Mt*LLPt and ADR* LLPt  provides no
evidence that the association between the provision and charge-offs of our affected and
unaffected banks differ in the pre-regulation period for either of our control samples. The
insignificance of these variables given the significance for our variables of interest
suggests that a lack of power is not driving our failure to find a difference. These findings
support the appropriateness of these two control samples.
Table 3 provides the results of our earnings persistence and predictability of
future cash flows models. We find significantly positive coefficients on
Post*500Mt*ROAt in both models. These findings are consistent with greater earnings
persistence and greater earnings predictability of future cash flows for affected banks
relative to unaffected banks in the post-period. The latter finding suggests that the
improvements in earnings quality are not solely the result of provision smoothing. The
coefficient on Post*ADR*ROA is significantly negative in both models, indicating that
this improvement is mitigated for the ADR banks unaffected by the regulation.
The lack of significant coefficients in the persistence regressions on the
500Mt*ROAt variable for both the Regulatory and COMPUSTAT samples combined
with the lack of significance on the ADR*ROAt coefficient in the predictability model
provides some additional assurance that our control samples are appropriate, since we
                                                 
17 Since loans may be charged-off in the same period they are provided for, we do not expect a one-to-one
relationship between the current provision and next periods’ charge-offs. As a sensitivity test, we re-
estimate the charge-off model using the sum of current and next period’s charge-offs as the dependent
variable. The significance of the results increases using this specification.
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detect no difference in reporting characteristics between the test and control firms in the
pre-period.18 Overall, the results for both samples are consistent with the FDICIA internal
control requirements leading to improvements in earnings persistence and predictability
of future cash flows for banks affected by the regulation.
We present the results of our benchmark-beating analysis in Table 4. We find a
significantly negative relationship, at the 1% level, between our primary variable of
interest, Post*500Mt, and the reporting of small positive earnings changes.
19 This finding
is consistent with affected banks being less likely to engage in benchmark beating than
unaffected banks in the post-period. We also find that the coefficient for ADR banks in
the post-period is positive and significant at the 5% level. The results for both samples
indicate that the internal controls regulation resulted in less benchmark beating.
Table 5 reports the accounting conservatism regression results. In both samples,
we find a significantly positive coefficient on the primary variable of interest,
Post*500Mt*ND*!ROAt, indicating that the timeliness of loss recognition declined for
affected firms in the post-regulatory period. This finding suggests a relative decline in
reporting conservatism associated with the internal controls regulation. We also find that
the coefficient on the ADR*Post*ND*!ROAt variable is negative, indicating that the
decline in conservatism is mitigated for these banks unaffected by the regulation.20
Reduced conservatism in affected banks could result from a reduction in the large
supplemental reserves that concerned the GAO (1994). Based on Bagnoli and Watts’
                                                 
18 For the COMPUSTAT sample, we do find a significant coefficient on the 500M*ROAt variable in the
predictability model and on the ADR*ROAt variable in the persistence model.
19 Consistent with Beatty et al. (2002), we include a variable measuring the change in cash flows in our
benchmark beating analysis. Since our cash flow measure is highly correlated with our earnings measure,
we omit the change in cash flows in a sensitivity test and obtain results consistent with those tabulated.
20 As an additional sensitivity check, we also estimated the Basu (1997) measure for our COMPUSTAT
sample and found similar results.
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(2005) argument, this reduction in discretion may inhibit managers’ ability to convey
private information, thereby reducing the overall information quality of their reports.
6.3 Quarterly Regressions
In Table 6 we report the results of our loan-loss models estimated using quarterly
data. The two variables of interest are Post*500Mt*LLPq, , which measures the affect of
the regulation in the fourth quarter and Post*500Mt*Q*LLPq , which measures the
incremental affect of the regulation in the interim quarters relative to the fourth quarter.
The positive and marginally significant coefficient on Post*500Mt*LLPq indicates a
slight improvement in the association between the loan loss provision and charge-offs in
the fourth quarter for affected relative to unaffected banks.   The positive and significant
coefficient on Post*500M*Q*LLPq, indicates that this effect is greater in the first three
quarters than in the fourth quarter.  This finding is consistent with an increased auditor
presence in the fourth quarter substituting for internal control regulation.
We find no evidence of a difference in the relation between the provision and
charge-offs between our affected versus unaffected banks in the pre-regulation period
based on the insignificant coefficients on the 500Mq*LLP and the 500Mq*Q*LLPq
variables. Again, this finding supports the appropriateness of our control sample.
Table 7 provides the results of our quarterly analysis of earnings persistence and
predictability of future cash flows. The results provide no evidence of a relative
improvement in earnings quality in the fourth quarter for affected versus unaffected
banks given the lack of significance on the Post*500Mq*ROAq variable. However, the
positive and significant coefficients on the Post*500Mq*Q*ROAq variable in both models
suggests that the regulation improved the quality of reported earnings in the first through
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third quarters for affected banks relative to those unaffected by the internal controls
regulation. The lack of significant coefficients on the 500Mq*ROAq and 500Mq*Q*ROAq
variables, coupled with our findings in the post-FDICIA period, again supports the
appropriateness of our control sample.
We also conduct quarterly benchmark beating and accounting conservatism
regressions. Although we document a reduction in the frequency of benchmark beating
and a decrease in conservatism for our affected firms in the post- FDICIA period we find
no evidence of a difference between interim and four quarters in either analysis.
Taken together, these results suggest that an increased auditor presence might
partially substitute for the effects of internal control regulation given the larger effect
found in the interim quarters for the validity of the loan loss provision and the quality of
reported earnings. The lack of a difference between the interim and fourth quarters for the
benchmark beating and conservatism measures may reflect a lack of power or suggest
that auditors focused less on these elements of financial reporting, allowing the internal
controls regulation to have a more pervasive impact.
7. Sensitivity Analyses
Although we use two distinct control groups to alleviate concerns about a bias
arising from differences between our test and control firms, we perform several
sensitivity tests to provide further evidence that our control samples effectively isolate the
effects of FDICIA internal control provisions. We do not tabulate any of these results.
7.1 Size Stratification and Public Versus Private Firms
We conduct four sensitivity analyses to address concerns about size differences
between our test and control samples. First, we include a non-linear measure of size (the
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square of total assets) in addition to the log measure, with no change in our results.
Second, we define two indicator variables, Small, if total assets are less $250 million, and
Big, if total assets exceed $60 billion. 21 Whether we estimate the regressions separately
for each indicator or combining both indicators, our results are unchanged when we allow
the primary coefficients of interest in our annual regressions to differ for Small and for
Big banks. This indicates that our results are not driven by either the smallest or largest
firms in our sample, since our results hold when we compare banks with assets greater
than $500 million but less than $60 billion to those with assets between $250 - $500
million. Third, we replace our Big variable with an indicator variable that equals one if
affected banks have assets greater than $1 billion, zero otherwise. Again we find that our
results do not appear to be driven by banks of a particular size, since our results hold
when we compare banks with assets greater than $500 million but less than $1 billion to
either those with assets less than $500 million or to those with assets between $250 -$500
million. Finally, we separately examine only affected firms broken into size deciles. We
find no systematic evidence of a difference in the estimated coefficients based on these
size deciles.
We also examine whether our results differ for publicly traded versus privately
held banks. We re-run our primary analyses allowing the coefficients to differ for SEC
filers versus non-filers. The results are very similar across all tests other than the
benchmark beating where the results become insignificant for the non-filers. Overall, the
split between public and private firms does not alter our inferences.
                                                 
21 $250 million is the median asset size for the regulatory sample. $60 billion in assets is the average for the
sample examined in Liu and Ryan (2006) and these banks represent the top one percent of our sample and
hold half of the total assets held by the banks in our sample.
29
7.2 Growth and Mergers
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to growth by estimating our models
separately for Regulatory sample banks with asset growth above the 7% median growth
rate, versus those with asset growth below the median. Our results are unchanged
providing no evidence that the bank merger wave during this period drives our results. To
further assess this possibility, we constructed a merger indicator variable for banks with
asset growth above 13%, the 75th percentile growth rate. This growth rate exceeds the
10% organic growth rate that A.T. Kearny (2005) argues is an “aggressive, if not
unrealistic” organic growth rate. We again find no differences in the coefficients for high
versus low growth for affected versus unaffected banks, in either the pre- or post-
regulatory period, providing no evidence that asset growth drives our results.
Since mergers and acquisitions affect entry and exit, we also compare these rates
for the affected versus unaffected samples. We find no difference in exit rates, but we
find that 18% of affected firms versus 26% of unaffected firms enter our sample in the
pre-period. We also note that in the post-period, 40% of affected and 76% of unaffected
firms enter our sample. This difference in entrance rates could potentially bias towards
our results if the entering unaffected firms have weaker financial reporting quality
measures. However, we re-estimate our models for firms entering the sample after 1987
versus those originally in the sample, and find no significant difference between the two
groups, suggesting that differences in survivorship do not drive our results.
7.3 Macro-Economic Controls
To control for changes in economic conditions we also re-estimated our models
including control variables for both changes in the seven versus one year Treasury bill
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rates and changes in credit spreads on BAA versus AAA rated debt. Our results are
unaffected by controlling for these changes in interest rates and credit spreads.
7.4 Debt-dominated Economies
To ensure that the ADR results are not driven by differences in banks located in
debt-dominated economies, we allowed the coefficients on our ADR variables to differ
for banks from Common Law versus Code Law countries using La Porta et al.’s (2000)
classification. La Porta et al. (2000) report that on average, equity finances 60% of GNP
for English Common Law countries while it averages only 32% for civil law countries.
We find no significant difference in the estimated coefficients on any of our ADR
variables between Common Law and Code Law countries suggesting that this distinction
is not driving our results.
8. Conclusion
We examine the internal control provisions mandated by FDICIA during the early
1990s to investigate how internal control regulation affects financial reporting. Our study
examines both the validity of specific accounts and the quality of financial reporting. We
identify two sets of control firms unaffected by the FDICIA internal control regulations,
and use a difference-in-differences research design to examine changes in the loan-loss
provision validity, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, benchmark beating
behavior, and accounting conservatism. We validate our control samples by testing for
differences between the affected and unaffected firms in the period prior to the
regulation.  This research design has many advantages, including the ability to control for
macro-economic effects and other regulatory changes, allowing us to isolate the impact
of FDICIA internal control provisions on the examined financial reporting characteristics.
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 Our results are consistent with FDICIA internal control requirements leading to a
greater association between the loan loss provision and loan charge-offs. Based on the
SAB 102 criteria, this suggests an improvement in the validity of the loan loss provision
We also document improvements in earnings’ persistence and predictability of cash flows
and find evidence of reduced earnings management activity, in the form of benchmark-
beating, in the post-FDICA period. Taken together, these results suggest that
improvements in internal control monitoring and reporting lead to improvements in the
quality of financial reporting in the banking industry. However, we also document a
decrease in accounting conservatism resulting from the internal control regulation. For
some, this may support the interpretation of improved reporting quality. However, others
may view a reduction in conservatism negatively.
By examining the FDICIA internal control provisions, we study the first
regulatory adoption of the COSO framework. Given COSO’s pivotal role in more recent
internal control regulations, including SOX, we argue that our results are important in
understanding the evolution of internal control regulation. The current financial crisis has
once again called into question the need for internal control regulation with some arguing
for increased regulation, while others argue that the failure of existing regulation to
prevent this crisis suggests that additional regulation would be futile.  Existing internal
control regulation research, particularly examining SOX, has had difficulty disentangling
the effects of the regulation from other contemporaneous events because of the lack of a
control sample of firms unaffected by the legislation.  Our setting and our difference-in-
differences research design allow us to make inferences about potential market-wide
implications of changes in internal control regulations. In addition, by examining the
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average financial reporting impact for all institutions affected by the FDICIA internal
control provisions, our results help assess whether the regulation improved financial
reporting for the industry as a whole. Therefore, we believe the results of this study
should provide valuable information to regulators and practitioners who are currently
debating the ever-changing landscape of internal controls regulation.
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Table 1
Mean and (standard deviation) of characteristics
Panel A: Regulatory Sample
Pre-Regulation Period  Post Regulation Period
Variable <500M* >500M** <500M* >500M**
CHGOFFt+1  0.0050
(0.0057)
 0.0078
(0.0066)
 0.0022
(0.0031)
 0.0031
(0.0038)
LLPt  0.0046
(0.0049)
 0.0066
(0.0059)
 0.0020
(0.0025)
 0.0025
(0.0030)
ROAt+1  0.0093
 (0.0092)
 0.0083
 (0.0090)
 0.0152
(0.0066)
 0.0170
(0.0064)
EBPt+1  0.0138
(0.0067)
 0.0150
(0.0063)
 0.0175
(0.0060)
 0.0196
(0.0065)
Small_Pos!t  0.1164
(0.3207)
 0.1670
(0.3730)
 0.1138
(0.3177)
 0.1351
(0.3418)
Sizet  5.0230
(0.6682)
 7.8710
(1.2581)
 5.4600
(0.3283)
 7.8461
(1.3446)
Panel B: COMPUSTAT Sample
Pre-Regulation Period Post Regulation Period
Variable <500M* >500M** ADR*** <500M* >500M** ADR***
CHGOFFt+1  0.0053
(0.0065)
 0.0058
(0.0054)
 0.0052
(0.0037)
 0.0018
(0.0033)
 0.0023
(0.0027)
 0.0043
(0.0047)
LLPt  0.0051
(0.0048)
 0.0066
(0.0062)
 0.0073
(0.0036)
 0.0028
(0.0041)
 0.0036
(0.0030)
 0.0070
(0.0072)
ROAt+1  0.0057
(0.0015)
 0.0081
 (0.0098)
 0.0092
(0.0073)
 0.0128
(0.0091)
 0.0168
(0.0063)
 0.0100
(0.0088)
EBPt+1  0.0123
(0.0125)
 0.0154
(0.0057)
 0.0177
(0.0053)
 0.0154
(0.0078)
 0.0196
(0.0061)
 0.0174
(0.0096)
Small_Pos!t  0.0938
(0.2938)
 0.1922
(0.3942)
 0.1538
(0.3655)
 0.1504
(0.3576)
 0.1999
(0.4000)
 0.1788
(0.3842)
Sizet  5.4903
(0.4930)
 8.7112
(1.1800)
 11.3674
(0.8282)
 5.4440
(0.4758)
 7.9380
(1.4812)
 10.7346
(1.5504)
*    Total Assets <  $ 500 million (FDICIA internal control provision threshold)
**  Total Assets >  $ 500 million (FDICIA internal control provision threshold)
***International bank with ADRs
Variable Definitions:
CHGOFF t+1 – Loan charge-offs during year t+1, scaled by beginning Total Assets;
LLPt – Loan-loss provision during year t, scaled by beginning Total Assets;
ROAt+n - Pre-tax Income during year t+n scaled by beginning Total Assets;
EBPt+1  - Pre-tax Income before Loan Loss Provision during year t+1 scaled by
Beginning Total Assets;
Small_Pos!t – An indicator variable that equals one if the change in ROA (Pre-tax Income
scaled by Total Assets) from year t-1 to year t is in the interval between 0 and
0.0008, zero otherwise;
Sizet - The natural log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t;
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Table 2
Coefficients (clustered t-statistics) from annual cross-sectional charge-off regressions for
Regulatory and COMPUSTAT samples.
CHGOFF t+1
Regulatory COMPUSTAT
Variable Predicted
Sign
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
Intercept +/- -0.0032 (-4.86)*** -0.0016 (-2.21)**
Post +/- -0.0008 (-7.20)*** -0.0003 (-0.48)
500Mt +/- -0.0003 (-1.69)* -0.0002 (-0.24)
Post*500Mt +/- -0.0006 (-2.56)** -0.0006 (-1.01)
LLPt +  0.7513 (4.98)***  1.0021 ( 7.99)***
Post*LLPt +/-  0.0600 (1.16) -0.3377 (-4.29)***
500Mt*LLPt +/-  0.0003 (0.01) -0.1199 (-1.29)
Post*500Mt *LLPt +  0.2883 (3.32)***  0.3498 ( 3.36)***
Sizet +/-  0.0003 (6.21)***  0.0004 ( 5.84)***
Sizet*LLPt +/- -0.9890 (-0.98) -0.0291 (-1.63)
Nonacct +  0.1500 (17.37)***    N/A   N/A
ADR +/- -0.0026 (-3.93)**
Post*ADR +/-  0.0026 ( 2.65)**
ADR* LLPt +/-  0.1182 ( 1.39)
ADR* Post*LLPt - -0.3139 (-1.89)**
Number of Observations
Adj R-squared
16,191
0.5628
4,401
0.5727
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed
test, as appropriate.
Variable Definitions:
CHGOFF t+1  – Loan charge-offs during year t+1, scaled by beginningTotal Assets;
LLPt              – Loan-loss provision during year t, scaled by beginningTotal Assets;
Post               – An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), zero
otherwise;
500Mt           – An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $ 500 million (the FDICIA
internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end of year t, zero
otherwise;
Sizet               – The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t;
Nonacct          -  Non-performing at then end of year t, scaled by beginning Total Assets;
ADR               – An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero
otherwise
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Table 3
Coefficients (clustered t-statistics) from annual cross-sectional earnings persistence and
predictability of cash flows regressions for  Regulatory and COMPUSTAT samples
ROAt+1 EBPt+1
Regulatory COMPUSTAT Regulatory COMPUSTAT
Variable
Sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept +/- -0.0014
(-0.92)
-0.0009
(-0.52)
-0.0018
(-1.30)
0.0070
(3.83)***
Post +/- 0.0009
(2.87)***
0.0043
(2.73)***
-0.0026
(-8.25)***
0.0001
(0.11)
500Mt +/- -0.0007
(-1.41)
0.0013
(0.67)
-0.0005
(-1.11)
 0.0024
(1.94)**
Post*500Mt +/- 0.0007
(1.33)
-0.0016
(-0.89)
-0.0013
(-2.12)**
-0.0029
(-2.28)**
ROAt + 0.9522
(8.66)***
0.9220
(8.34)***
0.7167
(7.48)***
0.6010
(5.52)***
Post*ROAt +/- -0.0054
(-0.26)
-0.1887
(-2.11)**
0.1539
(7.22)***
-0.0656
(-1.04)
500Mt*ROAt +/- -0.0523
(-1.49)
-0.1692
(-1.42)
-0.0414
(-1.37)
-0.2609
(-2.96)***
Post*500Mt*ROAt +/- 0.0724
(1.96)**
0.2467
(2.21)***
0.1148
(2.97)***
0.3206
(3.97)***
Sizet +/- 0.0003
(2.56)***
0.0003
(1.26)
0.0009
(7.79)***
 0.0003
(0.99)
Sizet*ROAt +/- -0.0156
(-1.70)*
-0.0147
(-1.03)
-0.0156
(-1.96)**
 0.0044
(0.27)
ADR +/- -0.0051
(-2.01)**
-0.0025
(-0.91)
Post*ADR +/- 0.0012
(0.044)
0.0035
(1.09)
ADR* ROAt +/- 0.4034
(2.16)**
0.2860
(1.52)
ADR* Post*ROAt - -0.3292
(-1.67)**
-0.3363
(-1.52)*
Number of Observations
Adj R-squared
16,191
0.5889
4,401
0.5384
16,191
0.5593
4,401
0.5024
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed
test, as appropriate.
Variable Definitions:
ROAt+n   -  Pre-tax Income during year t+n scaled by beginning Total Assets;
EBPt+1    -  Pre-tax Income before Loan-Loss Provision during year t+1 scaled by beginning Total
Assets;
Post        -  An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), zero
otherwise;
500Mt    –  An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $ 500 million (the FDICIA
internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end of year t, zero
otherwise;
Sizet      –  The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t;
ADR        - An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero otherwise.
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Table 4
Coefficients (t-statistics) from annual benchmark beating probit regressions of the propensity to
report small positive earnings changes (Small_Pos!t) for Regulatory and COMPSTAT samples
Small_Pos!t
Regulatory COMPUSTAT
Variable Predicted
Sign
Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
Intercept +/-   -0.9675 ( -4.14)***   -0.7966 (-2.17)*
Post +/-    0.0922 (  2.73)***    0.7179 (2.53)***
500Mt +/-    0.0222 (  0.35)    0.7359 (2.56)***
Post*500Mt -  -0.1504 ( -2.54)***   -0.6888 (-2.39)***
Sizet +    0.0138 (  0.85)    0.0204 (1.01)
Publict +    0.0561 (  2.00)**     N/A N/A
Growtht +/-  -0.4288 ( -4.05)***   -0.5554 (-3.72)***
Loanst +    0.3600 (  3.36)***     N/A N/A
NPLoanst +/- -27.0583 (-12.80)***     N/A N/A
Leveraget +/-    1.4001 (   2.73)***   3.0881 (2.87)***
!CashFlowt +/- -42.9650 (-12.65)*** -43.6228 (-9.22)***
ADR +/-   -0.23201 (-0.73)
Post*ADR +    0.5622 (1.68)**
Allowt +/- -48.2295 (-8.89)***
Number of Observations
Pseudo R-squared
16,191
0.0314
4,401
0.0616
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed
test, as appropriate.Variable Definitions:
Small_Pos!t – An indicator variable that equals one if the change in ROA (Pre-tax Income scaled
by Total Assets) from year t-1 to year t is in the interval between 0 and 0.0008, zero otherwise;
Post              – An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), zero
otherwise;
500Mt           – An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has Assets > $ 500 million (the
FDICIA internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end of
year t,  zero otherwise;
Sizet              – The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t;
Public           – An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is publicly traded, zero otherwise ;
Growtht         – the growth in Total Assets from the beginning to the end of year t ;
Loanst            – Total loans scaled by Total Assets at the beginning of year t ;
NPLoanst       –  Non-performing loans, scaled by Total Assets at beginning of the year t ;
Leveraget       – Total Equity divided by Total Assets at beginning of year t;
!CashFlowt  – Change in cash flows (Pre-tax Income before Loan Loss Provision) from the
beginning to the end of year t scaled by total assets at the beginning  of year t;.
ADR             – An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero
otherwise;
Allowt           – Allowance for Loan Losses at the end of year t, scaled by beginning Total Assets.
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Table 5
Coefficients (clustered t-statistics) from annual cross-sectional change in earnings regressions for
Regulatory and COMUSTAT samples
Regulatory COMPUSTAT
Variable Sign Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient (t-statistic)
Intercept +/- 0.0001    ( 0.30) 0.0009    ( 1.19)
Post +/- -0.0004    (-1.95)* -0.0020    (-2.54)**
500Mp +/- -0.0007    (-2.29)** -0.0021    (-2.50)**
Post*500Mp +/- 0.0009    ( 2.83)*** 0.0028    ( 3.25)***
ND +/- -0.0009    (-3.39)*** -0.0031    (-1.57)
ND*Post +/- 0.0006    ( 2.17)** 0.0034    ( 1.71)*
ND*500Mt +/- 0.0001    ( 0.21) 0.0022    ( 1.08)
ND*Post*500Mt +/- -0.0001    (-0.23) -0.0028    (-1.37)
!ROAt +/- -0.0441    (-0.84) -0.7349    (-6.14)***
Post*!ROAt +/- 0.0230    ( 0.34) 0.9854    ( 6.88)***
500Mt*!ROAt +/- 0.0278    ( 0.26) 0.6599    ( 4.36)***
Post*500Mt*!ROAt +/- -0.1706    (-1.35) -0.9911    (-5.41)***
ND*!ROAt   - -0.2658    ( -3.71)*** 0.6850    ( 1.58)
Post*ND*!ROAt +/- -0.1762    (-1.44) -1.2259    (-2.78)*
500Mt*ND*!ROAt +/- -0.0885    (-0.72) -1.5210    (-3.29)***
Post*500Mt*ND*!ROAt  + 0.3116    ( 1.67)** 1.4951    ( 3.10)***
Sizet +/- -0.0000    (-0.31) -0.0000    (-0.02)
ADR +/- 0.0010    ( 1.21)
Post*ADR +/- -0.0025    (-2.64)***
ADR*ND +/- -0.0015    (-1.09)
Post*ADR*ND +/- 0.0022    ( 1.49)
ADR* !ROAt +/- -0.9475    (-2.74)***
ADR* Post*!ROAt +/- 1.8978    ( 4.43)***
ADR* ND*!ROAt +/- 0.08762    ( 1.47)
ADR* Post*ND*!ROAt - -1.1807    (-1.71)**
Number of Observations
Adj R-squared
0.0515 0.1351
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed
test, as appropriate.
Where:
!ROAt+n – The change in Pre-tax Income during year t+n scaled by beginning Total Assets;
Post        –   An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), zero
otherwise;
500Mt     –  An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $ 500 million (the FDICIA
internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and  end of year t, zero
otherwise;
ND          –  An indicator variable that equals one if !ROAt  is negative, zero otherwise;
Sizet        – The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of year t;
ADR       – An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero otherwise.
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Table 6
Coefficients (clustered t-statistics) from quarterly cross-sectional charge-off regressions for
Regulatory sample
CHGOFF q+4
Variable Sign Coefficient (t-statistic)
Intercept +/- -0.0041 ( -5.89)***
Post +/- -0.0008 (-13.95)***
500Mq +/- -0.0002 ( -1.32)
Q +/-  0.0020 (  4.01)
Post*500Mq +/- -0.0003 ( -3.24)***
LLPq +  0.8134 ( 19.15)***
Post*LLPq +/-  0.0598 (  0.64)
500Mq *LLPq +/- -0.0829 ( -1.12)
Post*500Mq *LLPq +  0.3132 (  1.61)*
Q*LLPq + -0.2159 ( -4.03)***
Post*Q*LLPq +/-  0.1498 (  1.53)
500Mq *Q*LLPq +/- -0.0141 ( -0.18)
Post*500Mq *Q*LLPq +  0.2342 (  2.16)**
Sizeq +/-  0.0005 (  7.91)***
Q*Sizeq +/- -0.0002 ( -5.42)***
Nonaccq +  0.2804 ( 29.35)***
Q*Nonaccq +/- -0.1692 (-22.74)***
Number of Observations
Adj R-squared
66,908
0.4472
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed
test, as appropriate.
Variable Definitions:
CHGOFFq+4  –  Loan charge-offs during period q+4, scaled by Total Assets at the beginning of
quarter q+4;
LLPq             –  Loan-loss provision during period q, scaled by Total Assets at the beginning of
quarter q;
Post              –  An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), zero
otherwise;
Q                  -  An indicator variable that equals one in the first, second, or third fiscal quarter,
zero otherwise;
500Mq           –  An indicator variable that equals one if Total Assets > $ 500 million (the FDICIA
internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end of quarter q,
zero otherwise;
Sizeq               – The Log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of quarter q;
Nonaccq          –  non-performing at quarter q, scaled by Total Assets at the beginning of quarter
q..
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Table 7
Coefficients (clustered t-statistics) from quarterly cross-sectional earnings persistence and
predictability of cash flow regressions for Regulatory sample
ROAq+n EBPq+4
Variable Sign Coefficient (t-statistic) Coefficient  (t-statistic)
Intercept +/-  0.0002 ( 0.65)  0.0003 (0.95)
Post +/-  0.0005 ( 5.27)*** -0.0003  (-2.65)***
500Mq +/- -0.0002 (-2.08)** -0.0001 (-1.39)
Post*500Mq +/-  0.0005 ( 2.33)** -0.0001 (-0.56)
Q  0.0004 ( 1.13) -0.0000 (-0.02)
ROAq +  0.3537 (15.76)***  0.2182 (15.76)***
Post*ROAq +/-  0.0665 ( 1.84)*  0.1252 (4.20)***
500Mq *ROAq +/- -0.0237 (-0.73) -0.0373 (-1.68)*
Post*500Mq *ROAq + -0.0407 (-0.76)  0.0231 (0.49)
Q*ROAq +  0.1321 ( 4.62)***  0.1325 (5.83)***
Post*Q*ROAq +/- -0.0196 (-0.68)  0.0176 (0.74)
500Mq *Q*ROAq +/- -0.0356 (-0.92) -0.0219 (-0.78)
Post*500Mq *Q*ROAq +  0.0562 ( 1.34)*  0.0618 (1.91)**
Sizeq +/-  0.0001 ( 2.82)***  0.0002 (8.99)***
Q*Sizeq +/- -0.000 (-0.73) -0.0000 (-0.54)
Number of Observations
Adj R-squared
67,076
0.2683
67,076
0.5593
*, **,*** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on a one- or two-tailed
test, as appropriate.
Variable Definitions:
ROAq+n  –  Pre-tax Income during quarter q+n scaled by beginning of the quarter Total Assets;
EBPq+4   –  Pre-tax Income before Loan Loss Provision during quarter q+4 scaled by beginning of
the quarter Total Assets;
Post        – An indicator variable that equals one in the post-FDICIA period (after 1992), zero
otherwise;
Q           --  An indicator variable that equals one in the first, second, or third fiscal quarter, zero
otherwise;
500Mq    –  An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has Assets > $ 500 million (the
FDICIA internal control provision threshold) at both the beginning and end of quarter
q, zero otherwise;
Sizeq      –  The natural log of Total Assets in millions at the beginning of quarter q;
ADR      –  An indicator variable that equals one for non-U.S. banks with ADRs, zero otherwise.
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Figure 1 – FDICIA Reporting Requirements and their relationship to SOX Reporting Requirements 
 
  FDICIA SOX 
Independent Audit Committee   !36  !301 
Management Responsibility   !36 !302 
Report on effectiveness of IC   !36 !404 
Auditor attestation of management report   !36 !404 
Auditor attestation of IC’s effectiveness   N/A !404 
 Figure 2 – Ratio of other expenses to assets for effected (>$500M) and unaffected (<$500M) banks 
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